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Smith 

on 

Preparedness 



By SIMEON STRUNSKY 

Editorial Staff 
New York Evening Post 



Price 10 Cents 



For copies of this pamphlet apply to 

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Smith on Preparedness 



SIMEON STRUNSKY ^ 

Editorial Staff 
New York Evening Post 



Author 

Through the Ota-looking Glass 
with Theodore Roosevelt 



New York 



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Copyright, 1916 
By Simeon Strunsky 



-ff-io 
m 14 1918 



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ONE CITIZEN DOES HIS DUTY 

• New Year's eve, and well into the next day, 
Smith sat in his room and thought about prejoared- 
ness. 

The holiday season was different from any he 
could remember. The shops had bigger crowds 
tlian they had a year ago. More people on the 
train carried brown-paper parcels. People were 
much more cheerful. They were no longer waiting 
for Prosperity. They knew that Prosperity was 
here. Last year they had to force the holiday 
spirit. Now they were happy without trying. 

But not all the time. 

There was a shadow upon the holiday making. 
Smith's neighbor in the train would be talking of 
the revival of business, bumper crops, overflowing 
exports, and suddenly he would spy a fat headline 
across the aisle and remark that we were unpre- 
pared. Thereupon all hands would proceed to feel 
miserable. 

Unprepared for what.^^ 

Unprepared for everything. Unprepared for 
the German fleet when it chooses to come over. 
Unprepared for the British fleet when that comes 
over. Unprepared for the German and British 

3 



fleets when they come over together. Unprepared 
for Japan, for the Latin American, the hyphenated 
American, invasion, the destruction of our coast 
towns, the slaughter of our wives and children after 
the terrible manner of Belgium and the more 
terrible manner of the war-films. Unprepared if 
the w^ar in Europe goes on and still more unpre- 
pared if peace should come suddenly. 

Christmas that year was not what it should have 
been because people were unprepared for trouble. 

People were uneasy and perplexed and Smith 
was one of them. He would cling to a Subway strap 
with brown-paper parcels all over him and worry 
about our national defences. He wanted to know 
his duty. 

And then it occurred to him that tlie best way he 
could serve his country was to take a night off 
and think this matter through. The people he met 
were little help. When they talked preparedness 
they fell into set phrases. They had scarcely begun 
before they were susjjecting each other of being 
militarists and pacifists. 

That was the trouble, thought Smith, People 
have been arguing this matter too much Math each 
other. Why not talk it over w^ith one's self .^ Not 
on the train or in the restaurant or in the news- 
papers and magazines, but at home, where one 
could take all the time he wanted and not be 
tripped up on a clever debating point by the other 
fellow. Before he tackled the other man Smith 



wanted to establish what the diplomats call an 
Entente Cordiale with his own soul. 

He thought that would be a good way of begin- 
ning the new year. 

II 

IN CASE OF MISUNDERSTANDING 

Let me begin by defining my standpoint on pre- 
paredness^ said Smith. 

I am not a militarist. I am certainly not a 
pacifist. I do not believe in turning the other cheek. 
I am not in favor of leaving the first cheek unpro- 
tected against a blow that is sure to come. If a bigger 
navy is essential for the safety of the nation, then 
let us have a bigger navy. If, in addition, we must 
have a feigger army, let us have a bigger army. If 
universal military service is necessary for the 
preservation of this republic we must go in for uni- 
versal service. If we cannot avoid conscription, 
then let it be conscription. 

You see, said Smith to himself, I am not of those 
dangerous men who call themselves idealists. 
My perplexity arises from no conflict between a 
fixed ideal and the fear of being compelled to 
abandon it. I certainly do not want to blind my- 
self to facts. If, for instance, it should be shown 
that preparedness involves the survival of this 
nation, that is all there is to it. If the war leaves 
the nations in a position where dog eats dog, then I 
5 



i:>refer that this country shall be the dog that eats 
and not the dog that is eaten. 

I must make one correction. I have said that 
I am bound to no fixed idea. That is not quite 
true. I do have an ideal. I want this country to 
remain, if possible^ what people have been trying 
to make it for the last 140 years — a land of peace, 
industry, and democracy. That is the thing which 
sticks in my mind when I talk and think j^repared- 
ness. I find myself thinking less of what our 
preparedness will do to Germany, or England, or 
Japan, and more of what it will do to us. 

But even here I am practical. I am willing to 
.forego the ideal of democracy if it is a question 
of our national existence. If, for our survival as 
a nation, it is necessary that we become like Ger- 
many, then let us be Germany. If we can survive 
only under a Czar, then let us be like Russia. 

But what Smitli wanted to see was America sur- 
viving as America. 

Ill 
LESSONS OF THE WAR 

Seventeen months of war in Europe have taught 
a great many people a great many things. You 
only realize what a great war it must be when 
you see how many different lessons it has taught to 
different people. 



It is very odd. General Joffre has not yet 
learned the lessons of the war^ but Mr. Stanwood 
S. Menken has. Admiral Jellicoe walks the 
quarter-deck and worries, but that is presumably 
because he has not consulted Congressman Gardner 
who knows all about it. Mr. Asquith and the 
Kaiser are wondering how, after the war, peace 
can be made permanent. ]\Ir. Roosevelt knows 
how. 

Smith did not try to enumerate all the lessons 
of the war that have been learned on this side of 
the Atlantic. But here are a few: 

We need 400,000 Continentals (Secretary Gar- 
rison). 

We need 1,500,000 men (the War Staff). 

We need universal military service (Mr. Roose- 
velt). 

The submarine has done away with the Dread- 
nought (Naval Staff six months ago). 

The Dreadnought is queen of the seas (Naval 
Staff to-day). 

We need battle-cruisers (Secretary Daniels). 

I am not so sure about battle-cruisers (Admiral 
Goodrich). 

Coast-fortifications are jDlayed out (before 
March 18, 1915). 

Look at the Dardanelles! (after March 18, 
1915). 

We must have Prohibition (Captain Hobson). 

We must have suffrage (the Suffragists). 

7 



We must have eugenics (the Eugenists). 

But Smith found himself wondering whether the 
war in Europe has really taught us anything or 
whether it has only frightened us: 

Nearly every man I speak to is thinking of the 
horror of Europe. The thing weighs on our hearts. 
The millions of dead in the trenches, the ruined 
cities, women slaughtered and outraged, children 
starving — we think of these things hajopening to 
us and we say it must not be. 

But has the war taught us anything new about 
war.^ When we are at a loss for words to de- 
scribe the agony of Europe, we say War is Hell. 
This is fifty years old and was made in America. 
Have w^e ever been in danger of thinking that war 
is anything but hell? Europe has only confirmed 
what we have always known to be true — that war 
is horrible, that in war men become beasts, women 
suffer, children starve, cities burn. 

But the horror in Europe has no bearing on the 
question whether we are prepared or unprepared 
to ward off invasion. That is a question which 
mu§t be answered by the facts on this side of the 
Atlantic. Our coast artillery would shoot just as 
well or just as badly if the dead in Europe were 
only four hundred thousand instead of four million. 
Our battleships would steam just as fast or as 
slowly if Louvain had not been burned or Rheims 
had not been bombarded. A small-sized Hell is 
not much more attractive than a full-sized Hell. 



IV 

' WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR 

He had said that people were shaken by the hor- 
ror of Europe. Smith felt that was not the whole 
truth. 

A great many people in this country have been 
appalled by something more than the physical 
agonies of the war. They feel that they are in 
the presence of a moral catastrophe. They have 
discovered that our civilization knows no law but 
Force. Promises have been broken. Treaties 
have been violated. The rules of international law 
have been thrown overboard. A great many peo- 
ple now believe that a nation will go to war when- 
ever it thinks it can get the jumj) on its enemies, 
and with no other incentive than the exjDectation 
of victory. 

To-day we are afraid of peace as well as of 
war. In war a nation will break treaties, invade^ 
seize, violate. In times of peace it stands ready 
to begin breaking treaties, invading, confiscating, 
violating, the moment the chance offers. 

If this is true, then we must prepare to the hilt. 
If any nation will fall upon any other nation re- 
gardless of preexisting treaties, friendship, un- 
broken centuries of j^acific relations, then, of 
course, every nation must be on its guard against 
any and every other nation. 



Is this true? Do peoples and Governments go 
into war as light-heartedly as a County Dublin 
man into Donnybrook Fair? Sujjpose the German 
General Staff had decided in 1914 that America 
was just as easy to conquer as France. Would it 
have been a toss-up whether the German army 
should march upon Paris or the German fleet start 
out for New York? 

Smith was not a historian but he recalled some- 
thing of the forces and causes^ the rivalries and 
hatreds^ the wars and revolutions, that have made 
possible tlie great war of to-day- 
War and rivalry in the Balkans go back to the 
Turkish conquest of Constantinople nearly five 
hundred years ago and beyond. 

War and rivalry between Russia and her neigh- 
bors go back a thousand years to the time when 
Russia fixed her eyes upon Constantinople when 
it was yet Byzantium. 

War and hatred between Frenchman and Ger- 
man go back to the very foundations of modern 
Europe. Nearly tliree hundred years ago, Frencli 
armies laid waste German lands in the Thirty 
Years' War. One hundred and twenty years ago 
Prussian armies set out to destroy the French 
Revolution. What Napoleon did to Prussia, wliat 
Bliicher did to Napoleon, 1870-71 and Alsace- 
Lorraine — Smith knew tliat much. 

Rivalry and fear between England and Ger- 
many is not so old^ but war between the two has 

10 



not come overnight. Men have been expecting war 
and predicting war since Germany set out to build 
her navy^ twenty-five years ago. 

War between Russia and Japan did not come 
overnight. Ten years before^ Russia had joined 
with Germany and France to rob Japan of the 
fruits of her victory over China; and she continued 
to vex Japan. 

We went to war with Spain over Cuba. We 
nearly went to war with Spain over Cuba tliirty 
years before 1898. 

Nations do not go to war for trivial purposes 
and upon slight provocation. They know well 
enough what a bitter business it is. When they do 
go in the stakes must be high indeed, the impelling 
hate must be bitter and lasting. Nations do not 
grow irritated and jump at each other's throat. 
They growl, they threaten, they square off, they 
patch up a truce, they postpone the day of reckon- 
ing. Do you recall the crises of only the last 
twenty years which might have brought war and 
did not.^ Fashoda as between England and 
France ; the Kaiser's telegram to Kriiger ; the 
Kaiser's journey to Tangier; the Conference of 
Algeciras ; Austria's seizure of Bosnia and Her- 
zegovina ; the crisis of 1911 ; the crisis of 1913.'' 

You might sav that war did not come because 
one or the other nation was unprepared. France 
was not ready to > fight Germany in 1905. The 
following year Germany was not ready to fight the 

11 



present Allies. In 1908 Russia was not ready to 
fight Germany and Austria. This may be true. 
But doesn't this show that nations may hate and 
still hold back? Doesn't it show how high the 
\ cnom had to mount before tlie present catastrophe 
came.'' 

Nations do not fight at the drop of the hat. 



HYMN OF HATE 

Smith grew sad as he thought how thoroughly 
hated we are. We are to-day the best-hated 
nation on earth. Mr. Choate has said so. Smaller 
men have repeated it. Everybody hates us. There- 
fore we must i^repare against everybody. 

We haven't a friend in the world. England 
hates us because we have not come to her aid in 
fighting the battle of democrac}^ and individual 
freedom. 

France hates us for the same reason. In ad- 
dition she hates us for not sending enough free 
ambulances and Red Cross bandages. 

Germany hates us because of our munitions. 

Belgium and Scrvia liate us because we have not 
sent enough money and doctors and nurses. 

Consequently England, France, Germany, Bel- 
gium^ and Servia will attack us the moment they 
can get the jump on us. 

Smith recalled what someone said. War is more 
13 



dreadful because of what it does to the hearts and 
mindS' of men than for its killings, burnings, and 
outragings. This is true. See what war has done 
to the mind of a man like Mr. Choate. 

He finds that some Englishmen are irritated 
because the fighting is fine and we won't come in. 
It is true that a great many more Englishmen 
would rather not have us come in, but put that 
aside. Say that England as a whole is irritated 
with us. To Mr. Choate irritation is the same 
thing as hatred, and hatred spells war. 

France is vexed at us. To Mr. Choate vexation 
is the same thing as hatred, and that means war. 

Germany is angry with us because of American 
ammunition. German anger, Mr. Choate thinks, 
is hatred, and hatred means war. 

Belgium, Servia, Austria, Russia, are disgruntled 
with us. Mr. Choate believes it means war. 

Well, thought Smith, I meet a good many men 
a day who vex me and irritate me and leave me dis- 
gruntled. I can think of ever so many people 
whom I detest. I don't know how many street 
brawls most people have been in since they left 
school. I have been in very few. If irritations 
and detestations always led to conflict, the citizen's 
daily life would be one glad succession of assault 
and battery. 

If nations fought whenever they are irritated 
and disgruntled this poor world would never know 
a week of peace. 

13 



Does Mr. Clioate really believe that England 
bates us as she hates Germany? That Germany 
bates us as she hates France and Russia? That 
Belgium hates us as she hates the Kaiser? Does 
he really think that our blockade note meant tl.o 
same thing to England as the invasion of Bel- 
gium? That our refusal to come into the war 
means the same thing to France as Alsace-Lor- 
raine? That our munitions mean the same thing 
to Germany as the might of England, and the 
same thing to Austria as the murder of her imperial 
heir? 

Does Mr. Clioate really think that one year of 
anti-American sentiment means war as surely as 
tlie thousand years of wars, invasions, alliances, 
counter-alliances and festering hatreds, that have 
brought desolation upon Europe? 

Irritation, vexation, multiplication, invasion — 
does INIr. Choate think it is as simple as all that? 

It isn't a question of history, tliought Smith. It 
is a matter of common sanity and common-sense. 

VI 

INSURANCE AGAINST WAR— THE 
BENEFICIARY 

Smith liked the phrase about insurance against 
war: 

We are all agreed as to who sliould be the sole 
beneficiary when we insure against war. Our 

14 



country. The only question is how much or how 
little 'we include under that name. 

How do we go about the business of insurance.'^ 
By striking a balance between the amount of pro- 
tection we would like to buy and the premium we 
can afford to pay. 

Sensible men do not go without insurance. 
Neither do they insure in panic and pay premiums 
beyond their strength. No man in his senses would 
deprive his family of food and clothes for the sake 
of his complete peace of mind. In his last hour 
it would be rather absurd for him to glance at his 
pale and rickety brood and sigh^ "Anyhow^ they 
are well fixed." 

That kind of preparedness I have no use for. 

How is it when we speak of our wives and our 
children? In the last resort we think of a little 
group of physical beings and their absolute wants. 
Insurance enough to enable them to keep body and 
soul together when we are gone is the minimum 
policy we think of^ no matter how large the 
premium. None of us are pacifists when it comes 
to that kind of preparedness. 

But when we speak of protecting our family we 
mean something more than bare subsistence for one 
individual 5 foot 3, one individual 4 foot 6, one 
individual 3 foot 8. We think of them as beings 
with souls as well as bodies, with capacities for 
growth, with appetites for joy and love, with 
faculties for work, laughter, play, books, aspira- 
15 



tions, dreams. This complete life we want to in- 
sure for them. This is the higher preparedness 
we all desire. 

It is the same with our country. In the last 
resort^ in the face of invasion^ our country would 
be just our country: this stretch of soil between 
the Atlantic and the Pacific^ between Mexico and 
Canada, with the j^eople on it, and our outlying 
possessions with the people in them. To keep that 
soil inviolate and to safeguard the lives of its in- 
habitants is the minimum national insurance policy 
we can think of. No 23remium can be too high for 
that. 

But our country, in the absence of the peril of 
war, means much more to us than area and popula- 
tion. They are the skeleton upon which the nerves 
and muscles and flesh of a nation are stretched. 
And this living body is made up of all that our 
history and our feelings have poured into it, our 
record in the past and our hopes for the future, 
our functions and capacities, our good qualities 
and our bad, .our aspirations, our dreams. 

When we say America we speak, or love to think 
that we speak, of a land which prefers democracy 
to caste ; self-government to government from 
above; the business of work and trade to the busi- 
ness of fighting. We think of our country as a 
land where people are born as individuals instead 
of being cast from a mould, and where men may 
rise and fall through their own efforts instead of 
16 



remaining fixed to their anchorages by tlie accident 
of parentage. 

Smith knew that professors and such people are 
in the habit of sneering at ideals. But you and I, 
said Smith to himself, know that there are such 
things. We do not always carry them about with 
us. We find too often that they interfere with 
business. But we know that there is a better and 
a worse in life and if business allowed we would 
nmch rather do the better thing than the worse. 

After all we do not deliberately sit down and 
teach our children that the game of life is played 
with a sandbag and brass knuckles. We teach them 
other and finer things, hoping that experience will 
not give us the lie too often. You and I have ideals 
for our children. Every man has. 

It is the same with our country. We know that 
nations do not get on in life by continuous practice 
of the Golden Rule. Being human, we want our 
country to grow, be rich and cut a figure in the 
world. The ideal would be to have our country do 
all this and keep its soul clean. Being practical 
men we do not expect to see this come true, but we 
do want to see America come as near the ideal as 
may be. 

When we speak of our country we do not think 
only of America in America. We think also of 
America among the nations. There, too, we have 
an ideal. We want this nation, without sacrificing 
itself, to impress on the world the things we be- 

IT 



lieve in — self-government, democracy^, industry, 
peace, freedom from racial and religions hatreds. 
Every great people has done something for civiliza- 
tion. We want to contribute our share. 

Naturally we can give only out of what we have. 
We have no great religions to offer to the world, 
no great j^hilosophies and arts ; but we do have a 
religion and philosophy of social and political life. 
We have not produced a Zoroaster or a Mohammed, 
a Shakespeare or Goethe or Michael Angelo. But 
we have had Lincoln. 

VII 
IF NOT WE, THEN WHO WILL? 

Smith imagined himself setting out to build, from 
the foundations up, a land that should be proof 
against invasion. 

The object would be to establish a nation which 
might take the lead in upholding good-will against 
hate and peace against war. If the experiment 
failed, we should have to confess that there is noth- 
ing in the peace idea. It will have been tested 
under the most favorable circumstances. 

Here are the architect's specifications as Smith 
imagined them : 

Item : A big country ; with room for a great many 
millions of inhabitants ; a temperate climate ; great 
rivers and lakes to facilitate communication; moun- 
tains crammed with coal, iron, copper, gold, and 

18 



silver ; great plains for the raising of food ; forests 
and ' quarries for the construction of homes and 
factories and churches. In other words, a self- 
sustaining country. 

Item: a big population; both for the purpose of 
working the wealth of the land and for the feeling 
of security that comes from great strength. 

Item: a high quality population, so as to in- 
crease the original advantage of numbers. For 
that purpose Smith would pick the boldest, the 
hardiest, the most resourceful spirits of all other 
countries and transport them to his new land. 

Item: a couple of oceans, three thousand miles 
wide on one side, five thousand miles wide on the 
other, so as to make that country as secure against 
invasion as any country can be so made by natural 
barriers. 

Item: a country free from the traditions that 
afflict the rest of the world ; traditions of race 
hatred; traditions of religious hatred; traditions 
of military glory; the traditions created by the 
murderous philosophers and professors who are al- 
ways writing books to prove that what has always 
been, always must be. 

I have not filled in the details in my architect's 
drawing, thought Smith, but I have enough to 
make me wonder which of the nations of to-day 
comes closest to specifications. 

Remember. I am not speaking as an idealist. 
I am not saying that this country which we have 

19 



created is obliged at all hazards to hold up the 
banner of peace and international good-will. I am 
a practical man. I am only wondering whether 
this country would not be in a position to give the 
peace idea a more thorough trial than any other 
country. I am only wondering whether this nation 
ought not to be the last to be frightened into ac- 
cepting the war ideal. If the experiment fails 
here, where will it succeed .^ 

But then I don't want to be cocksure. Per- 
haps after all, America is not hig enough, strong 
enough, sufficiently sure of itself to show the way. 

War.^ Yes, we hate it in America. Peace.'* Yes, 
peace is our ideal. But let George do it. Let Wil- 
helm do it. Let Nicholas do it. Let Poincare do 
it. Let the shattered, ravening, maniac nations of 
Europe do it. . How absurd of them to turn their 
blood-shot eyes upon us, wondering whether wc 
will show them the way out. We dare not take the 
chance. We aren't strong enough. 

In the present-day panic of tlie white peoples, 
thought Smith, we are the only solvent institu- 
tion. When we go, white civilization is bankrupt. 

Would it mean then that the world's hope of 
peace goes overboard.^ I do not know. I have 
spoken hitherto of the world as though it were 
made up of Europe and America only. But there 
is Asia. There are still China and India. Who 
knows? Perhaps the ideals of Jesus may yet be 
realized by the people of Confucius and Buddha. 

^0 



VIII 

PANIC AND PLUCK 

Which of the two nations, the United States 
and England, would one say is to-day under harder 
pressure? Or is any man insane who would ask 
that ? 

Well, which of the two nations, the United States 
and England, shows clearer signs of going off its 
head? Think this over a moment and you will see 
that it is not England. 

Nowadays when I hear someone speak of Anglo- 
Saxon democracy, Anglo-Saxon freedom, Anglo- 
Saxon pluck, meaning England and America, I find 
myself thinking that the old phrases are still true 
of England but are no longer true of this country. 

Look at England. While we are conjuring up 
wars and invasions, England is facing the real 
thing. She is fighting for her Empire and the liis- 
tory of a thousand years. She has been througli 
seventeen months of war. She has lost nearly 
tliree-quarters of a million men. Slie has seen war 
rain down from the skies. She is facing an op- 
ponent tougher than Napoleon. She is undergoing 
the supreme test. 

Yet up to the present England has refused to 
go in for compulsory military service. 

Why? 

Because up to now, when an Englishman has 
spoken of his country he has meant a good many 

21 



of the things we mean when we speak of our 
country; and one of these things has been an 
aversion for conscript armies. It may be a virtue. 
It may be a prejudice. That does not matter. It 
is enough that in the England he knows and loves 
there is no place for armies on the European 
model. 

Before Englishmen will give up this idea which 
has grown very dear to them, they must be hard 
put to it. The thing may come, but after seventeen 
months of war and many defeats and disappoint- 
ments it is not here. More than once during these 
seventeen months England was in a tight place. 
Conscription might have helped her out. It was a 
risk, going on wdth the old method of voluntary en- 
listment. But she thought the risk was worth 
taking. 

Compare England's peril with our own "peril." 
Compare England's situation to-day with our own 
fears of what may happen to us ten years from 
now. Then think what it means that jDcople to-day 
should be speaking of universal military service as 
the only hope of American democracy. Througli 
seventeen months of war such as the w^orld has 
never seen England has held out against the sur- 
render of an old faith. Almost in the flash of an 
eye, and in times of peace we are asked to abandon 
tlie faith that goes back to tlie origins of our 
nation. 

This is not national defence, thought Smith. 
This is national panic. 



IX 

INSURANCE AGAINST WAR— THE RISK 

He recalled what he had said about insurance 
and premiums. He rehearsed it to himself. 

I said that no sensible man would leave his wife 
without food and clothes and put all his wages into 
insurance policies in order to protect her future. 

I can think of no man of sense starving his 
country in order to protect her future ; starving 
her of her ideals, of her reputation, of her self- 
confidence, of her role in civilization. 

Unless the unmistakable necessity is there. 

If America must become Russianized or Prus- 
sianized in order that she may survive, why then it 
must be. But the need must be shown. 

If we must give up our democratic faith in order 
to meet danger from without, let it be so. But 
the danger must be proved. 

But, thoug^it Smith, when some one tells me 
tijat we must give up this or that in order that 
we may be perfectly secured, in order that the 
country may be safeguarded for ever, he is a fool 
or worse. 

There is no such thing as perfect security. All 
life is a risk. We take chances in being born. We 
take chances in leaving the cradle. We take 
chances when we marry and bring children into the 
world. Life is a risk which men are glad to endure 
and for which men are willing to pay the price. 
23 



It is only a question of how heavy a risk a normal 
man oiiglit to carry. 

If, for America, the chances of invasion were 
twenty-five per cent, within the next ten years then 
we should be justified in sacrificing a good many 
ideals and liberties to pay for our protection. 

If, for America, the chances of invasion are one 
per cent, within the next ten years, then "universal 
military service tlie hope of democracy" is not 
preparedness but panic, not prudence but a be- 
trayal of ourselves and treason to America. 

It means that we haven't pluck enough to take 
a man's chance for what we pretend to value in 
life. 

X 

A BIT OF MODERN HISTORY 

He wondered whether he was growing senti- 
mental. 

Here am I calling myself a practical man, ad- 
dressing a plain citizen like myself, and I keep on 
talking of ideals, and aspirations and our duties 
to humanity. It is all very well to speak of what 
we can do for tlie ideals of humanity and the suf- 
fering nations of Europe. But what sort of appeal 
is that to the average citizen who can spare mighty 
little time from considerations of bread and butter 
to ponder on his duty to people three thousand 
miles away.^ 

Well, thought Smith, it seems to me that fe- 

21 



cisely the great mass of simple people have always 
shdwn that they have the ideals. It is the men 
who have to fight for bread and butter who have 
not infrequently given up their bread and butter 
for an idea. 

He remembered something about public opinion 
in England during our Civil War. The English 
aristocrats were against the Nortli. The com- 
mercial classes were hostile. But the English 
masses ? 

The workers in the English cotton towns were 
starving. The Union blockade was the reason. If 
England had intervened and forced an end to the 
war when the South was victorious there would 
have been work and bread for the English factory 
workers. 

Do you want to know how the workers of Eng- 
land suffered.^ Here is something from the Eng- 
lish press of that time: 

"The shadow of the American calamity is creep- 
ing with a slow but steady advance over the shining 
wealth of our cotton districts. Little by little the 
darkness grows. First one town and then another is 
swallowed up in the gloom of universal pauperism." 

"The cotton famine is altogether the saddest 
thing that has befallen this country for many a year. 
There have been gloomy times enough before this. 
But in the worst of our calamities there has seldom 
been so pitiable a siglit as the manufacturing dis- 
tricts present at this moment." 
25 



Before the cotton blockade set in there were in 
the poor-houses of fifteen English cotton towns, 
56,085 paupers. A year later there were 249,842 
paupers. That is how Englishmen suffered. 

And what did the English masses do when their 
rulers seemed bent on taking sides with the South ? 
They held public meetings and protested against 
"any apparent complicity with the Southern States 
in the clandestine equipment of warships." They 
adopted such a resolution in Manchester where the 
number of paupers had risen from 5,974 to 41,692 
in a single year. 

English workers were starving, but they met in 
their trade unions and John Bright spoke for them: 

"Impartial history will tell that, when many of 
your rich men were corrupt, when your press was 
mainly written to betray, the fate of a continent 
and its vast population being in peril, you clung to 
freedom with an unfaltering trust that God in His 
infinite mercy will yet make it the heritage of all 
His children." 

That is the way men in the factories weighed 
their bread and butter against the working out of 
a great idea three thousand miles away. 

On the whole, tliought Smith, it is safe to speak 
of ideals and service to Iniiranity, when addressing 
])]ain Americans. 



26 



XI 

IF GERMANY WINS 

He lit another cigar and went on: 

I am afraid I have been indulging in rhetoric, 
I find myself viewing with alarm and pointing the 
finger of scorn. Whereas the thing I really want 
to do is to get at the real meaning of preparedness. 

I know by this time how the problem presents 
itself to me. It is a practical problem. It consists 
in balancing the chances of invasion against the 
price we must pay for protection. I have been 
thinking of invasion the way most of us speak, 
Invasion with a capital I, from anywhere^, from 
everywhere. Let us get a little closer to the 
subject. 

If Germany wins — 

That, thought Smith, is one great fear that pos- 
sesses- people when they speak of national defence. 
They say Invasion, but they mean Germany — or 
Japan. Is it mere coincidence that so many men 
who are hot for preparedness, are heart and soul 
for the Allies.^ Mr. Roosevelt's pleas for national 
defence seldom omit mentioning our criminal in- 
difference with regard to the violation of Belgium. 
Men like Choate, Pinchot, any number of others T 
Flight mention, believe that we ought now to be 
f.ghting on the side of the Allies. They believe 
tliat we are now playing a role of cowardly 
neutrality because our navy is inadequate and our 

27 



army is virtually nil. If our navy vv^ere twice a,"^ 
big, if our army had half a million men, we should 
not be i)laying the coward to-day. 

And I imagine they are not altogether in the 
wrong. With a big army and a very big navy the 
human temptation to jump in might have been 
irresistible. Preparedness would have meant that 
\ve were prepared to jump into the European free- 
fight — and on the side of England. 

This begins to sound very much like pro-German 
argument. So let me explain how I feel about the 
present war, thought Smith. 

I want to see the Allies win. I want to see 
Germany beaten; not crushed as people used to 
say a year ago. I don't think it possible and I 
don't think it desirable for the good of the world. 
But I do want to see Belgium cleared, Servia re- 
stored, Germany getting no increase of territory 
in the east, and as much of Alsace-Lorraine handed 
back to the French as they ought to have by claim 
of nationality and the will of the people in the con- 
quered provinces. I believe it would be a calamity 
for the world if Germany's war philosophy and the 
spirit that animates her ruling classes and her pro- 
fessors should triumph. 

These being my sympathies in the present con- 
.fiict, what if Germany should win.^ 

Well, if Germany had won in a rush, if Paris 
had been taken, if the British fleet were shattered, 
I sliould be in favor of preparedness much more 

38 



drastic than what Mr. Wilson has advocated. But 
Germany has scored no such victory and expects 
no such victory. The most she hopes for is a bal- 
ancing of accounts with something on the credit 
side of her ledger. Will that kind of victorious 
Germany invade us.^ Will she leap on us as soon 
as she is out of her present mess, w^ithout pre- 
liminary friction, without giving us time to arm.^ 

That I cannot conceive. I think of the million 
dead which Germany will have harvested before the 
war is over and she has her "victory." I think of 
another million crippled and incapacitated. I think 
of her economic exhaustion, her hamstrung in- 
dustries, her vanished foreign trade, her enormous 
debts, and I cannot imagine Germany setting out 
with light heart upon the invasion of America. 

I think of the millions in Germany among whom 
even to-day the longing for peace is finding utter- 
ance. I think of the masses who are crying out 
against annexation of conquered territory in horror 
at the thought of perpetuated blood-feuds. I think 
of the men in Germany who ^vant reconciliation 
with the hereditary enemy, with France, with 
Russia, with England, and I cannot imagine Ger- 
many turning upon us. 

I think of Germany declaring war upon us and 
forcing upon millions of our "German-Americans" 
a bitterer choice than they have yet had to face. 
To-day they feel they have the right to take sides 
in a war between two foreign nations, of whom one 
29 



is the home of their ancestors. They could not 
and would not take sides with Germany against 
the United States. That is a fact which the Kaiser 
must reckon with. 

I try to think of Germany so enamored of a 
potato diet^ so crazy about milkless nurseries as to 
turn against us; and the thing is inconceivable to 
me. 

XII 

IF ENGLAND WINS 

I .said about our best-known advocates of pre- 
paredness that they want England to win the pres- 
ent war. They are not afraid of England. 

Still, there are others. To them the danger of 
England's victory in the present war arises not 
from England. It looms on the other side of tlic^ 
world — Japan. People may admit that the pros- 
pect of America and England at wir is incon- 
ceivable. But short of that, they will tell you, 
tliat England, with an eye to capturing the trade 
of the world would not be averse to seeing us at 
grips with Japan, and neutral England selling her 
goods like anything. 

It is a point worth considering. I believe firmly 
that if we ever have to think of invasion, it is to 
the Pacific we must look. And for a very simple 
reason. As against Europe I do not consider that 
we are open to invasion. Neither can I imagine 
a hostile army landing in San Francisco. But as 

30 



against Japan our coastline is not in California. 
It 'is in the Philippines. 

Here again I am severely practical. I might say 
that the Philippines are not worth fighting for. 
But, human nature being what it is, I recognize 
that if the Japanese land at Manila, the Philip- 
pines will become very much worth fighting for. 
If the Japanese take the Philippines without pro- 
vocation on our part, I should want to fight myself. 

Suppose, then, the thing has happened, and a 
Japanese army is in Luzon and Mindanao. What 
should we do.^ 

To me the problem is not complicated. To keep 
the Philippines, the Japanese navy must hold the 
sea. Very well, then. We will go out and smash 
the Japanese fleet. As a matter of fact, and in 
spite of what Congressman Gardner has told us, 
we are strong enough to do that now. But assume 
we are not. Then we can become strong enough 
in two years. We can outbuild Japan and take 
the Pacific from her. Having done that the rest is 
simple. We can raise and train an army of half 
a million men and ship them over to the Philippines 
and take care of the Japanese army. 

I know what people will say. If we are going to 
have a big navy and a big army to retrieve the 
Philippines, why wait for the Japanese to strike.^ 
Why not have the army now and insure ourselves 
against Japan's misbeliaving.^ 

31 



The answer brings me baek to the question of 
probability whieh is to me the very heart of the 
problem. I think the chances of Japan's attacking 
us in the Philippines are, say^ one in twenty. The 
risk, that is, is five per cent. And I consider a big 
army too high a premium. I am not thinking of 
the money cost. I am tliinking of the cost in 
sacrificed national ideals, in the befooling of our 
whole past. If we arm now we tell Japan that we 
expect her to play the thief. If we remain quiet 
we say that we think the chances are ninety-five 
per cent, that Japan will not play the thief. If 
any man thought me ninety-five per cent, respect- 
able I should be quite content. 

I know, of course, what would happen in this 
country if the one chance in twenty should come to 
pass and Japan should seize the islands. While 
we are increasing our fleet, while we are training 
our half-million men, we will chafe. We will 
resent the inglorious position into which we have 
been forced. We will say, "See, that is what hap- 
pens when you are not prepared." 

But I think the five per cent, chance of being 
humiliated for a period of two years is outweighed 
by the desirability of having America remain a 
democratic country. 

I won't even mention the chance that if we have 
a navy twice the size of Japan's and an army of 
half a million men, we sliall discover one fine day 
that the best way of keeping the Japanese out of 

33 



Manila is by landing an American army in Yoko- 
hom'a. Schemes for national defence have a way 
of turning out like that. 

XIIT 
IF IT IS A DRAW 

I say if it is a draw. But is there much doubt 
in any man's mind about that "if".^ 

Victory of the kind that makes a -people forget 
its sufferings and sacrifices is in sight for no one 
in the present war. We cannot foresee a tri- 
umphant Germany with her foot on the neck of 
England, menacing the world. We cannot foresee 
p triumphant England with her foot on the neck of 
Germany, her eyes turning uj^on us as the only 
rival to her interests and her prestige. Concede 
that one side or tlje other will emerge with a shred 
of conquered territory, with the fragment of an 
indemnity, what will this Europe look like after 
the war? 

It will be a Continent waking from a debauch of 
evil passions with a vast moral headache. It will 
be a Continent sick of slaughter, sick of hate and 
fears, bled white of its economic strength, pitifully 
weak and thoroughly ashamed. 

I am not dealing with fancies. The thing is 
there now. The nations are sick of killing and be- 
ivg killed, of starving and blockading, of march- 
ing and rotting in the trenches. I do not want to 

33 



exaggerate, I do not mean to say that England or 
Germany is sick of the war to tlie point of crying 
quits; thougli even that is not unlikely. They are 
in the grip of war and they have set their teeth 
and are determined to see it through. Because they 
see no way out. But men in England and Ger- 
many are looking for a way out. And in the 
meanwliile they are asking themselves, Why.^ 

It is the first instinct of man reasserting itself. 
When they are sane, men would rather create than 
kill, build than burn, plougli tlian lay waste. When 
peace comes, when the fire is out, men will go to 
work to rebuild the civilization of Europe. 

But they will do more than that. They will go 
on asking themselves why this thing had to be. 
They will look for some way to prevent its hap- 
pening again. They may fail. The next wai' 
will prove that. But they will try nevertheless. 
In this work of rebuilding the civilization of white 
men, should America help or hinder.^ 

I am not dealing in fancies. Tlie desire for a 
guarantee against another conflagration is to-day 
speaking out in every country. In Germany the 
Socialists were swept oil' their feet by the upheaval 
of international passions. They are beginning to 
find their bearings. They are talking, not only in 
Germany, but all over Europe, of tlie revival of 
international Socialism. They may fail; but they 
will try. 

34 



In England men are searching for a defence 
against secret diplomacy. 

In Russia, after the war, we may see one of the 
world's greatest battles for democracy. 

All over Europe the nations will engage in a 
struggle, silent or violent, against the forces which 
have brought about the calamity of to-day. They 
will protest against secret diplomacy, against the 
war-making power of the ruling classes, against 
the spirit of militarism, against the tradition of 
national hatreds and fears which the war-makers 
utilize for their own purposes. 

Will democracy succeed in Europe.^ I don'^ 
know. It may be the other way about. The ele- 
ments that stand for national hate may turn the 
results of the war to their own purposes. The 
heritage of the war may be, not reconciliation, but 
a fiercer hatred. The militarists may drive home 
their argument that the lessons of the war justify 
more militarism. The enemies of democratic con- 
trol in England may persuade the nation that 
Germany fought as well as she did because she 
was not bothered with democracy. In Russia the 
revolution may fail. 

But this much is certain. The forces of reac- 
tion may win out but they will know that they have 
been in a fight. The forces of democracy may turn 
out to be in the minority but the minority will have 
spoken. 

In the course of tliat battle, the men who fight 
35 



for a freer and safer Europe will turn their eyes 
across the Atlantic. I wonder which it would help 
them to see: America holding out against inter- 
national hates, armaments, secret diplomacies^, or 
America tossing democracy into the discard. 

Of course^ if we dare not take the chance, that 
is all there is to it. If European democracy goes 
down to ruin because w^e dare not cheer it on, we 
are still in a perfectly correct position to say, as 
Macbetli did to Banquo's gliost: 

Thou can'st not say, I did it; never shake 
Thy gory locks at me. 

I wonder. 

XIV 
A BIT OF ANCIENT HISTORY 

Smith, without knowing why, got to thinking of 
the fall of the Roman republic. Almost any man 
you meet can give you a reason why Rome fell, 
about 2,000 years ago. The number of complica- 
tions makes the case unique in medical history. 

The poor old Roman republic fell because it 
annexed too much territory ; because it lost its 
military s])irit ; because land ownership passed into 
the hands of a few jDcople; because the Romans 
adopted foreign customs ; because tlic}^ went in for 
circuses ; because the women went in for tight 
lacing; because the Romans didn't pay attention to 
eugenics ; because of anything you can think of. 

36 



And then Smith stumbled upon a secret. 
.The Roman republic never fell; that is, to its 
own knowledge. It just weakened, lost its grip, 
and tapered off into imperialism; but so quietly 
that for many years after it was dead the Roman 
rei3ublic was under the impression that it was still 
alive. 

If you think of Rome as waking up one fine day 
and discovering that its liberties were all gone, you 
are wrong. What happened was this. Rome would 
wake up in the morning and perhaps miss some- 
thing, but such a trifle that one couldn't really tell 
M'hether it had been there the night before. Next 
day something else would be gone ; rather a 
nuisance this time, but still nothing to worry over. 
And then one morning the Roman republic woke 
up and found Caius Julius Caesar Imperator sitting 
at the foot of the bed. 

Even then it wasn't such a dreadful change when 
one thought it over. There were no sudden de- 
partures in the forms of the Roman republic. The 
forms persisted though the spirit sickened and 
died. Caesar was at first Consul just as there had 
been consuls for half a thousand years before him. 
Then he became dictator, but there had been dicta- 
tors before. Then he was Imperator, which means 
general, just as there had been generals before. 
Long after the Empire, as we call it now, was 
established the forms persisted. The emperor was 
only the head of the State and went through some 

3T 



form of election. The popular assemblies retained 
some semblance of power. Laws were enacted by 
the Senate and the Roman People. When Rome 
finally knew herself as an Empire, she was only 
recognizing a change of form compelled by a 
change of spirit that had long ago taken place. 

People who live in a period of great change 
seldom think of themselves as breaking violently 
with the past. It is only the scholars who come 
long after who point out that here or there the 
liberties of a people "fell." 

Will it be left for the history writers of a 
hundred years from now to })oint out that from 
the year 1915 dates the fall of American de- 
uiocracy ? 

Absurd? Let us hope so. We, of to-day, feel 
that there is nothing essentially new in this busi- 
ness of preparedness. We already have a navy 
and we only add a five-year programme. We have 
an army and we are only quadrupling it. The 
changes will come as the result of popular will 
and constitutional procedure. Congress will vote, 
the President will sign, and everything will be as 
before. 

And yet. Smith thought, how swiftly a people 
can drift from its moorings. Secretary Garrison 
wants 400,000 Continentals. The War Staff want 
one and a half-million men. Senator Chamberlain 
wants conscription. This is doing well for less 
than a year of preparedness. 

:?8 



Mr. Iloosevelt doesn't ask for conscription. All 
he wants is universal military service. Not a 
standing army like that of Germany or France ; 
that would be un-American. All he wants is an 
American standing army. European militarism is 
a menace to democracy. But Mr. Roosevelt loves 
democrac3^ So he asks only for universal military 
service. We can keep our old names and titles 
and badges. Mr. Roosevelt is perfectly willing, 
provided we give him the men and the guns. 

Let us be calm then. Whatever happens, we can 
go on calling ourselves a democracy. 

XV 

EXPENSE ITEMS 

Smith recalled that the man who now says 
that universal service is the only hope of de- 
mocracy, on former occasions felt just as strongly 
that there were other things which were the hope 
of democracy. 

Smith recalled that some fifteen years ago tliis 
nation experienced a great awakening. Mr. Roose- 
velt had his share in it. We rubbed our eyes, 
looked about, found that things with us were not 
as they should be, and resolutely set to work at the 
task of making this a cleaner, freer, juster country. 
The Social Consciousness was born. We entered 
upon a period of great reforms. 

We began cleaning house in municipal politics. 
39 



We tried to wrench the grasp of big Business 
from our national politics. 

We got the popular election of Senators. 

We jDut through the Income Tax. 

We began Conservation. 

We tackled the Trusts. 

We began a wholesale onslaught on social misery. 
We began to clean our city slums and build cleaner 
tenements^ playgrounds, recreation centres, schools. 
We attacked tuberculosis, hookworm, pellagra, tra- 
choma, cancer, and lead-poisoning in the factories. 

We set to work to eradicate child-labor in the 
factories. We began to protect our women in the 
factories and from that went on to the protec- 
tion of men in the factories. 

We passed workmen's compensation laws, mini- 
mum wage laws, widows' pensions. 

We opened the door to women voters. Smith 
wondered if the women knew that they were fight- 
ing for a full partnership in a democracy whose 
only hope is universal military service. 

These are some of the tasks which the American 
people set for themselves in order to establisli 
social justice, to make this country a better place 
for their children to live in. 

What is to become of all this, thought Smith. 
We haven't the money because we need most of it 
for universal military service. But what is far 
worse, we haven't the inclination now that we have 
discovered that social justice is an illusion and that 

40 



the only hope of democracy is in universal mili- 
tary service. 

XVI 
OUR NAVY MELTS AWAY 

Smith thought of a deadly rejoinder to his entire 
argument. He had been reasoning that for us war 
is no more probable now than it was^ say^ three 
years ago and that consequently there is no need 
that we should be better prepared than we were 
three years ago. But suppose we were not pre- 
pared three years ago? 

That is precisely the contention frequently made 
in behalf of preparedness. We need not be 
frightened by the war^ but we should be fools if the 
war did not induce us to find out just where we do 
stand in the matter of national defences. Put 
aside the question of a very large army and a 
bigger navy with all the change it involves in our 
policies and traditions. The fact is^ says Con- 
gressman Gardner^ we haven't the navy and the 
coast defences provided for under our old policies 
and traditions. 

Especially the navy. Concerning the army we 
have never had any great illusions. We have al- 
ways thought of it as sort of glorified police force. 
To say that our army would stand little chance 
against the military forces of any other first-class 
Power is to say nothing new. But it is different 

41 



with the navy. We have always thought that our 
fleet ought to^ and does, rank very higli among the 
nations of the world. Now v/e are told that our 
navy is not second or third but fifth^ that it comes 
after, and not before, the Japanese and French 
fleets. 

It is worse than that. Our ships are under- 
manned, our guns are outranged, our submarines 
float when they ought to sink and sink when they 
ought to float. We are short of ammunition. Our 
gunners cannot shoot. 

If this is so, then there is nothing more to be 
said. We must prepare. But how shall we pre- 
pare.^ By taking these statements of Congress- 
man Gardner's at their face value or by trying to 
And out first whether they are so.^ 

Well, thought Smith, there is a thing called com- 
n on-sense. And my common-sense rejects this pic- 
ture of a pasteboard navy and coast fortifications 
drawn for us by Augustus P. Gardner and his dis- 
ciples. If you tell me that all at once our ships 
have lost the capacity to sail, our officers have for- 
gotten how to navigate, our men have forgotten 
how to shoot, our coast artillery has gone to sleep, 
tliat American ingenuity, initiative, pluck, have 
vanished overnight, and that our defences are an 
empty shell, then I simply refuse to believe it. 

But you need not take my opinion in the matter. 
If you must have experts there are the experts. 
The commander of our Atlantic fleet has said that 
43 



our navy to-day can hold its own against any fleet 
except Great Britain's. 

Isn't this a statement which goes to the very 
heart of the question? It rejects bluntly the pic- 
ture of a cardboard fleet sketched by Mr. Gardner 
and filled in by his disciples. Their familiar as- 
sumption^ tacit or expressed, is that in case of war 
with any of the great powers our fleet will be 
annihilated and America will lie open to invasion. 
But here is Admiral Fletcher to say that the 
French fleet cannot annihilate us, that Japan can- 
not, and that Gern'iany cannot. Should Admiral 
Fletcher's views be given some weight against Mr. 
Gardner's and Mr. ]\Ienken's.^ Isn't it our first 
duty to find out who is right, Admiral Fletcher or 
Mr. jNIenken.^ 

"Admiral Dewey Says Coast is Open to Hostile 
Force." So the Sun blazes it on the front page. 
What Admiral Dewey said in his admirably clear 
letter is this: // our navy is destroyed our coast 
fortifications are no guarantee against the landing 
of a hostile force. Consequently adequate naval 
defence demands "a navy strong enough to meet 
on equal terms the navy of the strongest possible 
adversary." 

No one denies that. Admiral Fletcher, when he 
says that our fleet is second to Great Britain's, as- 
serts that we have adequacy. Mr. Gardner and 
I\Ir. INIenken say no. Is it too much to ask that 
Congress should find out.^ 

43 



XVII 
COAST DEFENCE 

After our fleet is destroyed our coasts lie open. 
The president of the National Security League has 
said: "You know what our coast defences are. 
They may be good wliere they are^, but anybody 
can land and walk around them." 

But Mr. Garrison has said of our coast defences: 
"Yes^ sir^ they certainly are adequate for the jDur- 
pose for M'liich they were intended." 

Congressman Gardner says that the enemy's 
battleships can lie out of range of our forts and 
knock them about our ears. But the Chief of 
Coast Artillery has said: 

"All that has ever been claimed in the way of 
coast fortifications being able to successfully re- 
sist the attacks of warships has been and is being 
demonstrated — No fortifications in the world com- 
pare favorably with our own." 

And our Chief of Ordnance has said: "They 
[our fortifications] are of such power that naval 
officers would not put their ships up against them." 

Oh, well, keep your coast fortifications, says Mr. 
Gardner. All I ask is that our fleet be wiped out 
in the first clash of war. The enemy will then 
land where he pleases and in six weeks there will 
be 827,000 invaders on our soil. 

Do you want proof for the statement that 827,- 
44 



000 Germans or Japanese can land on our shores 
■wrtliin six weeks? Here it is: 

In 1898 it took us eleven days to transfer 16,000 
men from Tampa to Santiago. In 1905 it took 
General Oku's army of four divisions^ seven weeks 
to concentrate in JajDan and land in Liao-tung 
peninsula 600 miles away. It took England nearly 
tw^o weeks to ship 70,000 men of her standing army 
across the Channel. It took England and France 
nearly three months to throw less than 100,000 
men into Salonica from Egyjot and Marseilles. In 
every instance the shipping power had command 
of the sea. 

Consequently a foreign Power can land 827,000 
men on our shores in six weeks. 

I am not trying to work out the strategy of the 
invasion of America. I am only trying to picture 
the state of mind in which we have tackled the 
problem. 

XVIII 
IN A FOG 

Is it too much to ask that Congress shall take 
steps to lay before the country the facts upon 
which we are asked to build preparedness.^ At 
present the case is being tried in the newspapers 
and magazines, by everybody who can w^rite down 
columns of figures. It is not even necessary to 
add them up correctly. Where we have expert 
45 



testimony it is fragmentary, incidental, or lost 
amidst the vast outpouring of talk for and against 
preparedness. The people on either side who do 
know the facts have not been confronted with each 
other. I mean in the sense of being brought before 
the same tribunal of investigation which can 
balance contradictory data and give us a reasoned, 
complete report. 

We need to know whether our fleet is fifth among 
the nations or second. 

We need to know the whole truth about our 
coast defences. 

It is said that 90 per cent, of the people of this 
country are in favor of adequate national defence. 
Smith thought it should be 99 per cent. 

But what is adequate defence.^ Suppose it is 
established that our fleet to-day is adequate against 
any other fleet but Great Britain's as Admiral 
Fletcher believes. What then becomes of our fears 
concerning our exposed coast and our ineff'ectiv^e 
little army.^ 

That was what Smith could not put out of his 
mind. Do we know in the first place why we are 
being asked to prepare? Do we realize in the 
second place what we are being asked to give up^ 
We are in a haze about both questions. 

Here is an instance of the fog in which we are 
all working. When Mr. Gardner said that our 
coast guns had only sufficient ammunition for half 
an hour, Smith was astounded. He thought that 

46 



our coast guns ought to have, say, three months' 
ammunition at the very least. Had not the Allied 
fleets been banging away at the Dardanelles for 
nearly nine months ? 

Well, General Weaver admitted that our coast 
artillery hasn't as many shells as it ought to have. 
The ideal amount would be a two hours' supply. 
Of course, when you ought to have ammunition 
for two hours, ammunition for half an hour is 
rather bad. But Smith had been comparing half 
an hour with nine months. How was it with 
others ? 

That is the state of knowledge in which the 
country is tackling preparedness. 

XIX 
PANIC AND PREPAREDNESS 

I am back again where I started, thought Smith. 

I tried to make my standpoint clear at the be- 
ginning. If it is true that universal military ser- 
vice or an approach to it is the only hope of 
democracy then I am for universal military service. 
I go even further. If preparedness is necessary 
for the nation, I take preparedness even if it de- 
stroys our democracy, provided it saves the nation. 
There are times when a people for its self-preserva- 
tion must abandon its liberties. After the crisis is 
over we may start climbing back to our liberties. 
47 






% 



If we fail it is a tragedy but it cannot be helped. 
The nation must be preserved. 

Does the need exist .^ 

I believe in national defence^, thought Smith. I 
am only hesitating before a scheme of defence 
whose necessity has not been established and for 
which we must sacrifice most of the things in our 
national life we have always thought worth defend- 
ing. I find myself at one with the men in England 
who believe that in order to defeat Prussianism it 
would be a bitter price to Prussianize the English 
nation. If it must be^, it should be done — but not 
till it must be. 

We^ whose "danger" is as child's play compared 
with that confronting the British people^, our 
partners in Anglo-Saxon democracy^ are being 
asked to turn the national life into new channels, 
give up democracy, give up the privilege and the 
opportunity to do our share for civilization, shut 
up shop, go into moral receivership. That is, 
indeed, one way of saving a nation. 

All over Europe men are freely giving their 
lives for their country. But the country they are 
dying for, thought Smith, is a country that shall 
be worth living for. How is it with us.^ 

THE END 



48 



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